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CLEARING THE ROADBLOCKS TO
SOBRIETY CHECKPOINTS

In 1986, approximately 24,000 people died in alcohol-related
car accidents in the United States, a seven-percent increase over
1985. 1 An additional 650,000 individuals are injured in alcoholrelated motor vehicle accidents each year. 2 This tragedy translates into economic costs to the American taxpayer that exceed
$24 billion annually. 3
The average length of detention at a sobriety checkpoint" is
approximately fifteen to thirty seconds. 11 During that momentary
detention, law enforcement officials observe the motorist for
signs of intoxication. Studies conducted in California have
shown that the overwhelming majority of drivers stopped at sobriety checkpoints found this delay insignificant. 6 Although the
1. See NATIONAL CoMM'N AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING, PROGRESS REPORT ON RECOMMENDATIONS PROPOSED BY THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON DRUNK DRIVING 6 (1987). The
National Center for Statistics and Analysis of the National Highway Transportation
Safety Adminstration (NHTSA) estimated that 23,990 people died in alcohol-related
motor vehicle accidents in 1986, compared to 22,360 people in 1985. Id.
2. Stacey, Drunken Driving Arrests Have Dropped Since '83, USA Today, Feb. 29,
1988, at 5A, col. 1.
3. Id. These costs include property damage, medical treatment, and legal costs.
4. The term "sobriety checkpoint" is interchangeable with driving-while-intoxicated
(DWI) roadblocks and driving-under-the-influence (DUI) roadblocks. This Note will use
the label "sobriety checkpoint."
5. See, e.g., Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 1327, 743 P.2d 1299, 1303, 241 Cal.
Rptr. 42, 46 (1987) ("The average detention periods for those cars stopped was [sic] 28
seconds."); People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 279, 486 N.E.2d 880, 886 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1068 (1986) ("[M]otorists were detained for only 15 to 20 seconds, as long
as there was no need for additional questioning.").
6. D. Montagner, Operational Planning Section, Cal. Highway Patrol, Memorandum
to Planning and Analysis Division (October 9, 1985) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L.
REF.). The memorandum reports results of a survey conducted from May through August
1985, indicating strong public support for sobriety checkpoints. Table I shows the results
of the survey, tabulating the responses on the 2,473 survey cards that were returned by
drivers of vehicles that had been stopped at sobriety checkpoints in Bakersfield and
North Sacramento.
TABLE I

Did the sobriety checkpoint cause a significant delay to your journey?
Yes

No

Don't Know

Unknown

8.2%

90.7%

0.8%

0.2%
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inconvenience is very small, courts have found that the deterrent effect of sobriety checkpoints is very great. 7
This Note examines the constitutional and policy implications
of sobriety checkpoints. Part I discusses the competing interests
involved in implementing sobriety checkpoints. Part II presents
an appropriate constitutional standard for judging sobriety
checkpoints. Part III proposes reform-oriented measures that
conform to constitutional guidelines. This Note concludes that
properly conducted sobriety checkpoints are constitutional.
I.

COMPETING INTERESTS

Sobriety checkpoints have proponents and detractors. Proponents of sobriety checkpoints usually point to statistics showing
that drunk driving is a serious problem. 8 They argue that sobriety checkpoints effectively deter and detect drunk drivers. 9
Although opponents of sobriety checkpoints concede that
drunk driving is a serious problem, they argue that the roadblocks violate the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. 10 This Section examines the factors emphasized by both proponents and opponents of sobriety
checkpoints.
Do you approve of sobriety checkpoints as an enforcement measure to detect and remove
drunk drivers from the highway?
Yes

No

Don't Know

Unknown

87.1%
9.3%
3.0%
0.6%
Id. at 4.
7. See infra notes 21-22.
8. See supra notes 1-3, infra notes 11-19, and accompanying text.
9. For example, Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) contends that sobriety
checkpoints are particularly effective at deterring drunk drivers. Mothers Against Drunk
Driving, Sobriety Checkpoints 2 (undated position paper) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L.
REF.). The reason for this, MADD posits, is that community awareness of the risk of
arrest for drunk driving is heightened in those locales where sobriety checkpoints are
implemented. As a result, the fear of arrest deters people from drinking and driving.
MADD further cites the experiences of Delaware, Virginia, and the District of Columbia
to show that the arrest "yield" of sobriety checkpoints can be equal to or exceed that of
comparable resources used in traditional patrols. Id.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
The fourth amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
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The State Interest in Preventing Drunk Driving

The state has an overwhelming interest in eliminating drunk
drivers from public roads. 11 Courts have described this interest
as "compelling" 12 and of "enormous magnitude," 13 and have recognized the problem of drunk driving as one of "epidemic proportions. " 1" Statistics demonstrate that the courts have good
reason to use such strong language. In each year from 1982
through 1986, the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) estimates that over half of all fatal car
accidents were alcohol-related. 111
One study analyzed over one million accidents and concluded
that the proportion of fatalities among drunk drivers is 3.8 times
greater than that among sober drivers. 16 Another report estimates that one out of every two people will be involved in an
alcohol-related accident in his lifetime. 17
Alcohol-related motor vehicle accidents are characterized by
certain patterns. Eighty-two percent of all fatal accidents occur
between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m. 18 In some areas, it has been estimated
that one out of every ten drivers is legally impaired or drunk on
the typical weekend night. 19 These factors demonstrate the existence of an opportunity to target specific times when the need to
deter and detect drunk driving is greatest.
Advocates of sobriety checkpoints argue that the roadblocks
can and will reduce the casualty rate. 20 Many courts agree that
sobriety checkpoints are an effective tool to combat drunk driving.21 In particular, the courts have found that the deterrent ef11. State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 536, 673 P.2d 1174, 1181 (1983); see also South
Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558 (1983) ("The carnage caused by drunk drivers is well
documented and needs no detailed recitation here.").
12. People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 279, 486 N.E.2d 880, 885 (1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1068 (1986).
13. Deskins, 234 Kan. at 536, 673 P.2d at 1181.
14. State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45, 48, 691 P.2d 1073, 1076 (1984).
15. NATIONAL COMM'N AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING, supra note 1, at 6 (citing the estimates of NHTSA's National Center for Statistics and Analysis).
16. Findlay, Drunks, Accidents: Fatal Mix, USA Today, Sept. 19-21, 1986, at IA, col.
3.
17. Mothers Against Drunk Driving, A Summary of Statistics Related to the National
Drunk Driving Problem 1 (Aug. 1986) (unpublished collection of statistics) (copy on file
with U. MICH J.L. REF.).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See Mothers Against Drunk Driving, supra note 9, at 1.
21. See, e.g., Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 505-06, 479 A.2d 903, 913 (1984) ("[T]he
pilot program had a substantial impact on the drunk driving problem. . . . The prospect
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feet of sobriety checkpoints is singularly robust. 22 A survey of
motorists stopped at two sobriety checkpoints in California
shows that drivers believe that checkpoints increase the likelihood of detecting and arresting drunk drivers. 23 Public perception is important because people who believe that drunk drivers
will be caught are less likely to take the chance of driving while
intoxicated.

B.

The Individual's Privacy Interest

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals from "unreasonable searches and seizures."24 A
seizure occurs when a person reasonably believes that he is not
free to act as he chooses, taking into account the totality of the
circumstances. 25 Although this criterion appears straightforward,
it nonetheless causes the courts some difficulty. 26 For the purof being stopped at a roadblock thus convinced some intoxicated individuals to find alternate means of transportation.").
22. See, e.g., State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45, 48-49, 691 P.2d 1073, 1076-77
(1984) (concluding that sobriety checkpoints might be no more efficient than roving patrols at detecting drunk drivers, but finding that sobriety checkpoints were superior in
deterring drunk driving); People v. Scott, 63 N1Y.2d 518, 527, 473 N.E.2d 1, 4-5, 483
N.Y.S.2d 649, 652-53 (1984) (" '[T]he systematic, constitutionally conducted traffic
checkpoint is the single most effective action in raising the community's perception of
the risk of being detected and apprehended for drunk driving.'" (quoting the report of
the Governor's Alcohol and Highway Safety Task Force)).
23. D. Montagner, supra note 6, at 4. Table II shows the survey results that were
tabulated from 2,473 drivers that had been stopped at sobriety checkpoints.
TABLE II
Do you believe that sobriety checkpoints will increase a drunk driver's risk of being detected and arrested?
Yes
87.1%

No

Don't Know

Unknown

7.7%

4.7%

0.5%

Do you believe that sobriety checkpoints will deter some people from driving while
intoxicated?
Yes

No

Don't Know

Unknown

79.6%
13.5%
6.5%
0.4%
Id.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
25. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 503-04 (1983) (applying the standard used by
Justice Stewart in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). In Mendenhall, Justice Stewart stated: "[A] person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident,
a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." 446 U.S. at 554.
26. See, e.g., INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) (holding that when one member of
a large group of INS agents approached a factory worker and began to ask two or three
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pose of argument, this Note will assume that sobriety checkpoints ordinarily result in fourth amendment seizures. The
seizure occurs when a law enforcement official requires a vehicle
to stop because he has arguably "seized" both the car and its
occupants. 27
The resulting question is whether the "seizure" of a vehicle at
a sobriety checkpoint is a "reasonable" seizure under the fourth
amendment. 28 The traditional standard for measuring the reasonableness of interfering with an individual's right to privacy is
the demonstration of probable cause. 29 Probable cause exists
only when a law enforcement officer, using reasonable caution,
confronts someone she believes is engaging in criminal activity. 30
The officer must know facts or circumstances that justify her belief that the person either has committed, or is committing, a
criminal offense. 31
Without probable cause, only a brief and limited detention is
authorized. 32 Such a detention must be no longer than necessary
under the circumstances, 33 and must be no more intrusive than
necessary to achieve its purpose. 34 Accordingly, it is important to
measure the extent to which sobriety checkpoints intrude upon
accepted boundaries of privacy.
Law enforcement procedures are not all equally intrusive upon
privacy or individual liberties. For this reason, some seizures are
constitutionally permissible although others are not. For example, traffic signals cause the involuntary detention of motor vehicles, resulting in delay and inconvenience to the driver. The constitutional validity of traffic signals remains uncontested,
however, because signals do not intrude upon individuals' rights
to privacy. Moreover, because traffic signals cannot distinguish
among motorists, they ensure a fair and impartial distribution of
inconveniences.
questions, the agent's behavior would not have led a reasonable man to believe that he
was not free to leave without responding).
27. Cf. United States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622, 624 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding that a
seizure occurred although a driver was physically free to drive away, because the police
showed sufficient authority to cause a reasonable driver to feel obliged to stop).
28. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
29. For a discussion and definition of the probable cause standard, see Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925).
30. Id. To detain an individual, an officer is required to have reasonable grounds for
her act. The officer's suspicion can be based either upon personal knowledge or upon
information communicated to the officer by third parties. Id.
31. Id.
32. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983).
33. United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89, 90-91 (9th Cir. 1973).
34. Id.
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Toll booths at bridges and expressways also result in the involuntary detention of motor vehicles. When a driver stops to
pay a nominal sum for using a particular road segment, she may
be subjected to the glances and surveillance of the booth attendant. The attention paid to particular motorists is unlikely to be
systematic. Nonetheless, the state does not stigmatize motorists
by forcing them to stop at toll booths. The reason for this is
twofold. First, the driver is secure in the knowledge that the
booth attendant will treat each motorist similarly; toll booth attendants rarely have discretionary powers. With this equal treatment, no reasonable driver would feel stigmatized. Second, toll
booths have gained wide public acceptance. 311 Sobriety checkpoints can be administered analogously to toll booths. 36
Courts also have noted that, because an automobile's occupants and contents are at least partially visible to others on the
roadway, a driver has a lower privacy expectation in his car than
in his home or office. 37 It is unreasonable for someone driving on
public roads to expect people to avert their eyes at the sight of
an oncoming vehicle.
II.

MATCHING SOBRIETY CHECKPOINTS WITH AN APPROPRIATE
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD

This Section examines the constitutional tests courts employ
to determine the appropriateness of various regulatory procedures. These tests balance competing interests and investigate
reasonableness. Using this approach, the United States Supreme
Court has upheld some searches even where probable cause was
conspicuously absent. The use of balancing was also a resonant
feature in the Court's decision to uphold fixed border checkpoints. That decision upheld searches that were conducted in
the absence of individualized suspicion. Among the balancing
tests articulated by the Court is the administrative-search
framework. The Section concludes that sobriety checkpoints
meet the requirements for classification as administrative
searches.
35. In this respect, they are similar to sobriety checkpoints. See supra note 6 and
accompanying text.
36. "[T]he humiliation implicit in being singled out as an object of suspicion is absent [from roadblocks)." 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 9.5(a), at 549-50 (2d ed. 1987) (quoting MODEL CoDE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 266 (1975)).
37. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976).
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A. Balancing the Competing Interests
Given the significant interests of both individual privacy and
public safety, courts have suggested possible methods for choosing between the competing interests. The United States Supreme Court suggests one possible framework in Terry v. Ohio. 88
In Terry, the Court held that probable cause is not a constitutional prerequisite for conducting a stop-and-frisk. 39 Even
though a stop-and-frisk is unquestionably a seizure under the
fourth amendment, the Court found that such a seizure might
not be unreasonable;' 0 The Court further held that the reasonableness of police conduct is a function of balancing the need to
search or seize against the intrusion that such a search or seizure
would cause. 41 If the need to search or seize outweighs the corresponding intrusion, then such a search or seizure is constitutionally permissible. 42 The two key elements weighed in the balance
were the protection that a stop-and-frisk affords a patrolling officer and the intrusiveness of a seizure used only to find
weapons. 43
A drunk driver behind the wheel of a two-ton automobile is a
person with a formidable weapon. Moreover, the goal of sobriety
checkpoints is not only to protect patrolling officers, but also to
protect the public in general. The problem with using the Terry
rationale to justify sobriety checkpoints is that the checks are
conducted in the absence of the requisite particularized facts
and exigencies germane to a Terry frisk. For this reason, the fact
pattern of sobriety checkpoints suggests that an alternative
38. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Terry Court examined the constitutional standard governing the manner in which a police officer conducts a stop-and-frisk. The term "stopand-frisk" refers to limited protective searches conducted when an officer believes that a
suspect might be armed. An example of a stop-and-frisk would be if an officer patted an
individual's clothing in an attempt to discover dangerous weapons. See id. at 26.
39. Id. at 27 ("[T]he issue is [instead] whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in
danger.").
40. Id. at 26-28. The Court found that the officer's decision to conduct a stop-andfrisk was reasonable based upon the officer's suspicion that the suspects were about to
commit a robbery. This was so even if the officer did not have adequate information to
take the suspects into custody for the purpose of prosecution. Id.
41. Id. at 21.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 26. Searches must be "strictly circumscribed by the exigencies" that justify
their initiation. Thus, in the case of the stop-and-frisk, the search "must be limited to
that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the
officer or others nearby, and may realistically be characterized as something less than a
'full' search." Id.
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standard to the traditional Terry test might be more
appropriate.
In addition to Terry, the Court announced another fourth
amendment test that fits the sobriety checkpoint situation more
squarely. In these cases, courts look beyond the situation directly visible to the government agent engaging in a search and
consider the net gain or loss to society that would result from
using the specific search method.•• Thus, when evaluating the
need for sobriety checkpoints at a particular location, it would
be appropriate for a government official to consider empirical
evidence that illustrates the extent of the drunk driving problem
in the community. In these situations, courts look first to the
amount of delay involved in the search.• 11 Next, the courts look
to the amount of discretion accorded the government agent
making the search.•6 Under this general societal balancing, the
Court, in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, upheld fixed border
checkpoints for immigration control. •7 This method of analysis
has also led the Court to invalidate roving checks for valid
driver's licenses in Delaware v. Prouseu as creating great potential for abuse. •9
This standard appears to be a sensible method by which to
judge the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints. In fact, the
Court specifically stated that "[q]uestioning of all oncoming
traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative" to the
roving checks invalidated in Prouse. 50 The Court reached this
conclusion notwithstanding a simultaneous finding that stopping
a vehicle and detaining its occupants was a "seizure" within the
44. See, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972) ("[W]e reject respondent's
argument that reasonable cause for a stop and frisk can only be based on the officer's
personal observation . . . . ").
45. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976). In considering the
question of whether permanent border checkpoints are consistent with the fourth
amendment, the Court noted that border checkpoints resulted in only minimal interference to legitimate traffic. Id. at 559.
46. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) ("[Our] holding does not preclude
the State of Delaware or other states from developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion.")
47. 428 U.S. 543, 562-63 (1976) ("[W]e hold that the stops and questioning at issue
may be made in the absence of any individualized suspicion at reasonably located checkpoints. . . . [T]he intrusion here is sufficiently minimal that no particularized reason
need exist to justify it . . . . ").
48. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
49. Id. at 662-63.
50. Id. at 663. The Prouse case specifically deals with checks for driving licenses. The
government interest in ensuring safe roadways, however, is served at least as well by
preventing drunk driving as it is by keeping unlicensed drivers off the roads.
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meaning of the fourth amendment. 111 The Court upheld the fixed
checkpoint in Martinez-Fuerte, noting that, although the checkpoints operated without individualized suspicion and without
advance judicial authorization, "the need to make routine checkpoint stops is great, [and] the consequent intrusion on Fourth
Amendment interests is quite limited." 112 The Court noted that
the checkpoint stops were principally limited to a brief question
or two directed at the vehicle's driver, and that the level of visual inspection was significantly less than in a roving patrol
stop. 53 As the next section of this Note will argue, this analytical
approach fits comfortably into the administrative search
framework.

B.

Sobriety Checkpoints as Administrative Searches

In Camara v. M!lnicipal Court, 5 " the United States Supreme
Court held that general-area building inspections require warrants, but that obtaining a warrant need not "depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling. " 55
Accordingly, health and safety inspectors were allowed to make
routine inspections of various structures and dwellings. 56 The
Court found that such inspections were necessary to achieve
widespread compliance with municipal codes. 57
Because it recognized the government's stake in preventing
conditions that might endanger public health and safety,118 the
Court found that the traditional test of probable cause was best
viewed as a test to determine whether a particular general-area
inspection was reasonable. 59 Thus, the Camara majority described the need for inspection in terms of the reasonable goals
of code enforcement. 60 As the Court noted, balancing the overall
51. Id. at 653.
52. 428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976).
53. Id. at 558.
54. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
55. Id. at 538.
56. Id. ("[T]he area inspection is a 'reasonable' search of private property within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment . . . . ").
57. Id. at 535-36 ("[T]he only effective way to seek universal compliance with the
minimum standards required by municipal codes is through routine periodic inspections
of all structures.").
58. Id. at 537.
59. Id. at 538 ("[l]t is obvious that 'probable cause' to issue a warrant to inspect
must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area
inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling.").
60. Id. at 537.
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need to search against the invasion necessitated by such a search
is the only appropriate test. 81 Finally, the Camara Court concluded that "reasonableness is still the ultimate standard"82 and
stated, "If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted
search warrant. " 83
The reasoning set forth in Camara has been used to analyze
the constitutionality of a wide variety of general regulatory
schemes designed to protect the public. For example, airport
searches and screenings have been justified using the Camara
rationale. 8' In People v. Hyde, routine antihijack screening procedures were found reasonable despite the fact that probable
cause was conspicuously absent. 811 Although probable cause did
not exist for each individual who passed through the airport, the
court was able to balance the competing interests and found
that the public's right to safe travel prevailed. 88
Application of the Camara holding has not been limited to
airports. The administrative search rationale has been applied to
food establishments,87 premises licensed to sell alcoholic beverages,88 and pharmacies. 89 In addition, inspections without individualized suspicion have been upheld for junkyards,70 coal
mines,71 and stores licensed to deal in sporting weapons. 72 Fi61. Id. at 536-37.
62. Id. at 539.
63. Id.
64. See People v. Hyde, 12 Cal. 3d 158, 524 P.2d 830, 115 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1974) (upholding predeparture screening of all passengers and carry-on baggage).
65. Id. at 165, 524 P.2d at 834, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
[S)earches conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an
administrative purpose, rather than as part of a criminal investigation to secure
evidence of crime, may be permissible under the Fourth Amendment though not
supported by a showing of probable cause directed to a particular place or person to be searched.
Id. (citing United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973)).
66. Id. at 167, 524 P.2d at 835, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
67. State v. Phelps, 12 Ariz. App. 83, 467 P.2d 923 (1970).
68. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
69. United States ex rel. Terraciano v. Montayne, 493 F.2d 682, 685 (2d Cir. 1974)
(upholding inspections expressly limited to business hours, where health officials' authority is not extended to forcible entry).
70. State v. Wybierala, 305 Minn. 455, 459, 235 N.W.2d 197, 199-200 (1975) (holding
that, where defendant is a licensed junk and secondhand dealer, regulations are particularly needed because such shops are the places where thieves usually attempt to dispose
of stolen property).
71. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45, 51 (S.D. Ohio 1973)
("The governmental interest in promoting mine safety, it might be concluded, far outweighs any interest the mine operators may have in privacy.").
72. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972).
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nally, courts have approved administrative searches at truck
weigh-stations and inspection checkpoints. 73
The United States Supreme Court concluded that where "regulatory inspections further [an] urgent ... interest, and the
possibilities of abuse and the threat to privacy are not of impressive dimensions, the inspection may proceed. " 7 • The key to a
Camara-type administrative search is whether the particular
government interest can be protected adequately by limiting
searches solely to cases of individualized suspicion.n In People
v. Hyde, the fact that "airline officials may have no particularized suspicion [that] a prospective passenger is armed or dangerous does not operate to vitiate the search."76 The airport screenings are generally conducted with courtesy and expediency, and
alternative techniques are unlikely to yield much success. 77
The Camara Court examined three principal criteria to determine the appropriateness of an administrative inspection. First,
the Court stated that such programs must have public acceptance. 78 In the case of sobriety checkpoints, the evidence suggests
that drivers stopped at sobriety checkpoints approve of their
use. 79 When this fact is combined with the burgeoning number
of groups that vocally oppose drunk driving, 80 and with the legislative response to that public outcry, measures to combat
drunk driving seem to have gained public acceptance.
The second criterion developed by the Camara Court is
whether an alternative canvassing technique that would achieve
acceptable results is available. 81 The almost 24,000 drunk-driving fatalities estimated to have occurred in 1986 demonstrate
that acceptable results are not being achieved. 82 Accordingly,
73. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 n.26 (1979) (noting that the Court's
holding does not cast doubt "on the permissibility of roadside truck weigh-stations and
inspection checkpoints, at which some vehicles may be subject to further detention").
74. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972).
75. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967). As an example, the
Court noted the difficulty of observing faulty wiring from outside a building. The Court
found administrative inspections reasonable only when no other technique can achieve
acceptable results. Id.
76. People v. Hyde, 12 Cal. 3d 158, 167, 524 P.2d 830, 835, 115 Cal. Rptr. 358, 363
(1974).
77. Id. Moreover, "it [is] impracticable, if not impossible, for airline officials to seek a
search warrant for individual passengers." Id. at 168-69, 524 P.2d at 836, 115 Cal. Rptr.
at 364.
78. 387 U.S. at 537.
79. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
80. Typical examples of those groups are Mothers Against Drunk Driving and Students Against Drunk Driving.
81. 387 U.S. at 537.
82. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
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there is a need to implement new measures to ensure compliance
with laws that require motorists to act safely.
The third criterion used by the Camara Court is that inspections must not be personal in nature. 83 For example, in People v.
Hyde, everyone entering the airport was equally subject to
weapon screening. 84 Camara further stated that such inspections
must be aimed at preventing crimes rather than at their discovery.86 Unfortunately, this requirement is somewhat ambiguous.
The Camara Court applied it to building inspections despite the
attachment of criminal sanctions to exposed violators. 86 Similarly, individuals who bring weapons into an airport in violation
of the law face prosecution. Nonetheless, most courts have found
sobriety checkpoints more effective at deterring drunk driving
than at detecting drunk drivers for the purposes of arrest and
prosecution. 87
Sobriety checkpoints are closely analogous to other searches
that the Court has subjected to administrative-search scrutiny.
It is thus appropriate to apply the administrative-search framework to sobriety checkpoints. Sobriety checkpoints meet each of
the criteria delineated in Camara. As a consequence, sobriety
checkpoints qualify as constitutional administrative searches.

Ill.

PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

New strategies are necessary because of the inability of current law enforcement methods to curtail drunk driving sufficiently. Sobriety checkpoints alone will not solve the problem.
Rather, a comprehensive program designed to reduce drunk
driving must be enacted. Although sobriety checkpoints are only
one aspect of such a program, they are nevertheless an important component.
The Constitution requires more than merely demonstrating a
great state interest to override fourth amendment concerns.
Even demonstrating that a particular law enforcement technique
results in social gain, as measured by a cost-benefit test, is insufficient to secure its constitutionality. Instead, the fourth amendment requires that the government use the least intrusive means
83.
84.
85.
86.
search
87.

387 U.S. at 537.
12 Cal. 3d at 169, 524 P.2d at 837, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
387 U.S. at 537.
387 U.S. at 531 (noting that discovery of a violation during an administrative
often leads to a criminal complaint).
See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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available to correct the problem in question. When implementing sobriety checkpoints, binding guidelines are necessary to
minimize checkpoint variation and officer discretion. Similarly,
the· Constitution requires minimal inconvenience to the motorist. Only with such restrictions can courts find sobriety checkpoints constitutional.

A.

Use of Alternative Programs

Sobriety checkpoints are needed to achieve "acceptable results" in the fight against drunk driving88 because roving patrols
and other enforcement mechanisms have failed to reduce sufficiently the dangers created by drunk driving. 89 One argument
favoring the use of checkpoints emphasizes that the drunk and
erratic driver may cause injury before he is spotted by a roving
patrol car. Another is based on the claim that it is difficult to
spot a drunk driver. This difficulty may increase in heavy traffic
or at night. Many drunk drivers, although able to avoid conspicuously erratic movements, are nonetheless driving with an impaired ability so that they do not have the necessary reflexes to
respond adequately to the sudden changes in the environment
that drivers regularly face. 90
As a result of the difficulty in spotting drunk drivers, it is necessary to implement a host of auxiliary programs to detect and
deter drunk driving. A program may limit the availability of alcohol by increasing age restrictions on alcohol purchases and
88. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
90. People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 287, 486 N.E.2d 880, 886 (1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1068 (1986).
[T]he ability of a drunk driver to avoid erratic movements along a roadway does
not mean he will be able to respond to an emergency where prompt reflexes may
be of great importance. . . . [Given that) the carnage caused by drinking and
then driving is so serious it warrants resort to both types of apprehension stopping automobiles which are being driven erratically and roadblocks to detect
drunken drivers before they drive in an erratic manner.
Id.
Professor LaFave has noted that:
[E]ven .if a patrolling officer is fortunate enough to be in the vicinity where a
drunk driver is operating his vehicle, it does not necessarily follow that the
driver will at that particular time drive his car in such a fashion as to create a
reasonable suspicion justifying a stop. And the chances of such observation in
the first place are rather slight, given the substantial number of intoxicated drivers on the roads.
3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 36, § 10.8(d), at 72-73.
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thereby reducing drunk driving among youths.B 1 Similarly,
dramshop and social-host liability legislation may encourage
those who serve alcohol to act responsibly.B 2 It is also necessary,
however, to deter those individuals who have ready access to alcohol. When such individuals decide to drink and drive, the decision usually involves some consideration of the risk involved.
Although typical drivers may conclude that "they can handle
it," drivers may be less sure they can avoid detection by government authorities if an effective checkpoint program exists.
As part of a comprehensive program to combat drunk driving,
sobriety checkpoints serve to deter and detect drunk drivers.
The fear of arrest often reduces the frequency with which occasional offenders drive under the influence of alcohol. One reason
that the driver may be less willing to drive drunk is the likelihood of heavy punishment if convicted. Thus, stiff sentences
will, to an extent, help reduce the number of individuals who
drive while inebriated. For this reason, fourteen states impose
mandatory sentences on first-time drunk drivers.B 3 Eighteen
states even refuse to permit plea-bargaining in driving-while-intoxicated cases. 94 Individuals may fear exposure and conviction
almost as much as the criminal penalty itself, particularly if the
penalty for first-time offenders is less severe. As educational programs become more effective and social mores change, it is probable that communities will take drunk driving more seriously.
Perhaps then drunk drivers will be treated like other violent
criminals. Still, the number of arrests resulting from a particular
measure should not be the sole criterion used to gauge the success of the technique or methodology employed.B11 Rather, it is at
91. See NATIONAL CoMM'N AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING, supra note 1, at 4. Forty-nine
states now require purchasers of alcohol to be at least 21 years old. Id. See also Mothers
Against Drunk Driving, Research on Teens - Drinking & Drugs & Driving 1 (Aug. 1986)
(citing NHTSA statistics showing that driving while alcohol-impaired is the leading
cause of death for individuals aged 16 to 24).
92. See NATIONAL CoMM'N AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING, supra note 1, at 4. Twenty-five
states have dramshop statutes. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 287, 486 N.E.2d 880, 886 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1068 (1986).
The National Transportation Safety Board's Safety Study on deterrence of
drunk driving recognizes the deterrent potential of drunk-driving roadblocks.
The study points out that they preclude drunk drivers from assuming they will
escape trouble simply by driving cautiously. In addition, the study points out
that sobriety checkpoints are visible aspects that drunk driving is being combated and they afford police the opportunity to observe a larger number of motorists than would be possible during typical patrol procedures. Admittedly the
possibility that a driver will face a roadblock on his way home will not discour-
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least as important to deter drunk drivers in the first place. To
this end, sobriety checkpoints will "preclude drunk drivers from
assuming they will escape trouble simply by driving cautiously."98 Moreover, sobriety checkpoints reinforce the message
that government takes drunk driving seriously because checkpoints serve as a visible warning to both drunk drivers and sober
drivers who contemplate driving in an impaired state.

B. Minimizing Discretion and Variation
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "[w]here a
careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests
that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment
standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause,
we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard."97 However, as
the Court. suggested in Delaware v. Prouse, one condition on
which reasonableness may depend is the level of unbridled discretion attaching to a particular checkpoint program. 98
In a recent case, Ingersoll v. Palmer, 99 the California Supreme
Court upheld the use of sobriety checkpoints. 100 The court held
that, "while the intrusiveness of a sobriety checkpoint stop is
not trivial, the enumerated safeguards [in the case] operate to
minimize the intrusiveness to the extent possible. " 101 Thus, the
court declared that, "[o]n balance, the intrusion on Fourth
Amendment interests is sufficiently circumscribed so that it is
easily outweighed and justified by the magnitude of the drunk
driving menace and the potential for deterrence." 102 For the balance to tilt in favor of sobriety checkpoints, the Ingersoll court
age all drunk driving, but on the basis of common sense alone one must conclude
that many persons aware of that prospect will have second thoughts about
[drinking and] driving.

Id.
96. Id.
97. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (discussing the application of the
fourth amendment to school search cases).
98. 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979).
99. 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 743 P.2d 1299, 241 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1987).
100. Id. at 1350, 743 P.2d at 1319, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 62. The California Supreme
Court subsequently used Ingersoll as its basis for vacating a 1986 California appellate
opinion that found sobriety checkpoints unconstitutional. In Re Richard T., 44 Cal. 3d
775, 750 P.2d 297, 244 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1988), cert. denied sub nom. Richard T. v. California 57 U.S.L.W. 3392 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1988) (No. 88-318). See also Savage, Roadblocks to
Check Driver Sobriety OKd, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 6, 1988, at 1, col. 3 (discussing the
United States Supreme Court's decision to deny certiorari in the Richard T. case).
101. 43 Cal.3d at 1347, 743 P.2d at 1317, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 60.
102. Id.
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emphasized two essential factors: (1) decisionmaking must be
made at the supervisory level, and (2) discretion of field officers
must be limited. 103 These factors decrease the danger of arbitrary and capricious enforcement. 104 Most other states upholding
the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints have also emphasized the need for checkpoint operations to follow a plan drafted
in advance by supervisory personnel. 1011
Perhaps of paramount importance is eliminating officer discretion with regard to selectivity in stopping motorists. Discretion
allows roadblocks to act as the functional equivalent of roving
patrols. To this end, the California Supreme Court mandated
that sobriety checkpoints either stop all motorists or every motorist at a fixed interval (e.g., every fifth car). 106 Similarly, field
officers must be required to treat all motorists equally until
probable cause of an offense is established. 107
Courts should review the promulgated guidelines. 108 This is
consistent with the theory that field officers should follow carefully drafted guidelines delineating checkpoint procedures, including substantial planning and briefing. An administrative
warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate or judge should
be required in advance of implementing a sobriety checkpoint.
The magistrate or judge should ensure that both officer discretion and motorist inconvenience are minimized. Since the sobri103. Id. at 1341-42, 743 P.2d at 1313-14, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 56-57.
104. See id. at 1342, 743 P.2d at 1313, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
105. See, e.g., Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 490, 479 A.2d 903, 905 (1984). In Little,
comprehensive regulations were reviewed first by the Superintendent of the Maryland
State Police and then by the Attorney General and the Governor. See also State v. Superior Court, 14:cl Ariz. 45, 46-47, 691 P.2d 1073, 1074-75 (1984) (including a detailed command directive prepared by the Commander of the Traffic Enforcement Division of the
Tucson Police Department outlining guidelines for officer behavior and procedures for
operating the checkpoint); Commonwealth v. Trumble, 396 Mass. 81, 89, 483 N.E.2d
1102, 1107 (1985) (holding that the guidelines for officer behavior contained ample provisions to ensure safety and minimal inconvenience to motorists and also clearly proscribed the arbitrary selection of vehicles); Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 351, 337
S.E.2d 273, 276-77 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1083 (1986) (finding that officers assigned to roadblocks were given 24 hours of training and a manual signed by the Chief of
Police listing checkpoint locations, assignment of personnel, safety provisions, interviewing procedures, and other aspects of a detailed routine).
106. Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 1342, 743 P.2d 1299, 1314, 241 Cal. Rptr.
42, 57 (1987) (holding that a "neutral mathematical selection criteria" should be
employed).
107. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). "[A]ny further detention ... must be based on consent or probable cause." Id. at 567 (quoting United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975)).
108. See Opinion of the Justices, 128 N.H. 14, 509 A.2d 744 (1986) (answering a request of the New Hampshire House of Representatives and holding constitutional sobriety checkpoints that were subject to a system of independent review by a neutral and
detached magistrate).
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ety checkpoint is, by definition, implemented without individualized suspicion, the same exigency as often exists in other cases
is not present. Thus, subjecting sobriety checkpoints to the delays involved in obtaining an administrative warrant will not detract from their effectiveness.

C.

Minimizing Inconvenience

In Ingersoll u. Palmer, the California Supreme Court identified several factors essential to the smooth administration of a
sobriety checkpoint.1°9 The constitutionality of a sobriety checkpoint depends in part upon the checkpoint's performance in
these categories, as the Constitution requires that the government not interfere with individuals' lives any more than is necessary. The factors cited by the California Supreme Court are:
(1) the checkpoint must be reasonably located; (2) the time and
duration of the checkpoint must be set in good judgment; (3)
indications of the official nature of the roadblock must be present; (4) the average time each motorist is detained must be minimized; and (5) advance publicity must accompany the institution of each checkpoint. 110
The smooth operation of sobriety checkpoints requires trained
officers. The training may involve drills where officers practice
asking brief questions to stopped drivers. It may also include
teaching officers how to offer literature to passing driversm or
how to shine a flashlight in the vicinity of the driver to determine the driver's condition. 112 To ensure the constitutionality of
the seizures, the supervisory guidelines must place adequate restrictions both on how the field officers observe the drivers and
on how they question them. 113
The location of the checkpoint is important for two reasons.
First, the checkpoint should not unduly interfere with the safe
flow of traffic. 114 This consideration also requires other features,
109. 43 Cal. 3d at 1342-47, 743 P.2d at 1314-1317, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 57-60.
110. Id.
111. See Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 351, 337 S.E.2d 273, 276 (1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1083 (1986); see also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 1327, 743
P.2d 1299, 1303, 241 Cal. Rptr. 42, 46 (noting that the screening officer handed each
driver stopped an information flyer).
112. See People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 288, 486 N.E.2d 880, 886 (1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1068 (1986).
113. See supra note 111.
114. See State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575, 583, 427 A.2d 131, 135 (1980).
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such as adequate lighting. m Second, the government interest in
implementing sobriety checkpoints is strongest on those roads
known to have high accident rates resulting from drunk
driving. 116
Sobriety checkpoints should be clearly marked as official police stopping points to reduce potential fear and anxiety of passing motorists. Uniformed officers should be visible to approaching motorists to assure drivers that the checkpoint is
legitimate. 117 In addition, advance publicity on the general use
of sobriety checkpoints will prevent unnecessary surprise and
confusion to motorists. 118 The publicity will also have the valuable side-effect of deterring drunk driving. 119
IV.

CONCLUSION

The average length of detention at a sobriety checkpoint is
approximately fifteen to thirty seconds. 120 Drunk driving results
annually in thousands of deaths, hundreds of thousands of injuries, and billions of dollars in property damage. 121 These competing interests must be balanced in order to assess the desirability of sobriety checkpoints. These are also the factors weighed
in the constitutional balancing test of the fourth amendment.
The application of a warrant-based administrative search
must be limited to an evenhanded, uniformly administered inspection. Where unnecessary police officer discretion or checkpoint variation exists, the checkpoint cannot survive constitutional objections. This means that if an officer asks a motorist to
pull to the side, or to step outside of his car, the officer is obliged
to demonstrate probable cause based on individualized circum115. See Commonwealth v. Trumble, 396 Mass. 81, 90, 483 N.E.2d 1102, 1109 (1985)
(discussing the need for signs, flares, and flashing lights).
116. Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 1343, 743 P.2d 1299, 1314, 241 Cal. Rptr.
42, 58 (1987); see also People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 288, 486 N.E.2d 880, 887 (1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1068 (1986). The time that the checkpoint operates is also important. The court notes that "the frequency of violations is known to increase at night and
· particularly as patrons return from drinking establishments which have just closed." Id.
117. 43 Cal. 3d at 1345, 743 P.2d at 1316, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 59; see People v. Peil, 122
Misc. 2d 617, 617, 471 N.Y.S.2d 532, 533 (1984) (discussing use of uniformed deputy
sheriff).
118. 43 Cal. 3d at 1346, 743 P.2d at 1316, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 60.
119. Id.
120. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
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stances. 122 Similarly, inconveniences to motorists must be
minimized.
The ultimate decision whether to implement sobriety checkpoints must be based on their effectiveness. The degree of effectiveness is a critical factor in assessing both policy and constitutional considerations. In measuring effectiveness, however, it is
important to remember that the appropriate variable is not the
number of arrests made, but rather the number of lives saved. 123

-Mark R. Soble

122. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 9, 22, 95, and accompanying text.

